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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE G. McANERNEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC Case No. 8969 
SAFETY, DRIVERS' 
LICENSE DIVISION, and 
GEORGE C. MILLER, Director, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ST~TEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are undisputed. Mr. McAn-
erney is a resident of Utah. He is the sole sales rep-
resentative in the intermountain area for a large 
paper company (R. p. 11). By the nature of his 
business he is required to drive long distances, aver-
aging 800 to 1000 miles a week (R. p. 11-12). He 
has been driving an automobile since 1932, a period 
of 27 years, and has never been involved in an ac-
cident (R. p.12-13). 
On March 8, 1956, he was arrested by the Utah. 
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Highway Patrol for speeding in Brigham City. On 
March 28, 1957 he was arrested by the Utah High-
way Patrol for speeding near Farmington, Utah, 
being clocked at 66 miles per hour in a 50-mile 
zone. On May 28, 1957, he was arrested for speed-
ing in Salt Lake City. On the basis of these three 
arrests the Department of Motor Vehicles did issue 
a notice of suspension of his driver's 'license for a 
three-month period. On October 11, 1957, after Mr. 
McAnerney had come to see defendant George Mil-
ler, this was changed to a restricted license (Ex. 
P-1, p. 2). Mr. McAnerney has been charged with 
no other traffic offenses in the State of Utah until 
May 19, 1958, when he was again arrested for 
speeding on South State Street in Salt Lake County. 
The files of the Motor Vehicle Department have 
reports from the Arizona Highway Patrol indicat-
ing a charged traffic violation in Tucson on March 
16, 1958, (which McAnerney testified was for mak-
ing a "rolling stop" on a Sunday morning. R. p. 15-
16) and from the State of Nevada indicating a 
charged violation in Nevada January 23, 1958, 
(which McAnerney testified was for going about 
35 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone. R. p. 16-17). 
On July 1, 1958, Mr. McAnerney received an-
other notice of suspension suspending his license for 
six months, for the stated reason of habitual negli-
gent driving. On July 22, 1958, Mr. McAnerney and 
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his counsel did request a hearing and appeared on 
that date before defendant Miller who read over his 
file with the dates and offenses charged against Mc-
Anerney and did inform them that this constituted 
a hearing, that he would not go behind on the docu-
ments in his file, and that McAnerney was habitu-
ally negligent ( R. p. 1-2.). McAnerney appealed 
from this determination and after hearing the Dis-
trict Cou--t~ the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson pre-
siding, did on August 8, 1958, rule that the order 
of suspension of McAnerney's license was null and 
void and would be set aside (R. p. 30-32.). 
Shortly thereafter, on September 4, 1958, de-
fendants did issue an additional order of suspen-
sion. McAnerney requested in writing a hearing 
and on September 22nd McAnerney and h'is coun-
sel appeared before Mr. Miller and a stenographer 
of his office. 
The stenographer's notes, introduced in evi-
dence as Exhibit P-1, showed that the fol1lowing was 
said: 
This is a hearing before George C. Mil-
ler, Director of Drivers' License Division, as 
hearing officer. 'This is the date set as re-
quested by George Gardner McAnerney at the 
request of his attorney Albert J. Colton as 
the result of a six months' suspension of Mr. 
McAnerney's driving privilege in the State 
of Utah. 
The record can show that his license had 
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been suspended by the Drivers' License Divi-
sion on October 7, 1957 for a period of three 
months at which tim~ Mr. McAnerney re-
quested a hearing and was granted a restrict-
ed driver's license to drive in connection with 
his work with International Paper Company. 
The record will further show that there is here 
in connection with this hearing the driver 
license folder of Mr. McAnerney including 
the Reports of Conviction from the respective 
courts wherein Mr. McAnerney has been 
charged with certain violations of the traffic 
laws. The record may show that in the opi-
nion of the Department it is not necessary to 
subpoena any of the officers who have given 
citations or the judges to prove the convic-
tions in this driver folder nor to subpoena 
any witnesses, nor any records in addition 
to the record as held by the department. 
Mr. Colton: Just a minute Mr. Miller, 
do you intend to put on any evidence? 
Mr. Miller: None whatever other than 
the record itself. 
Mr. Colton: Are you offering the re-
cord as e,~idence? 
Mr. Miller: I am accepting it as evi-
dence. 
Mr. Col ton : 1~ ou are acting in this case 
in the capacity of the hearing officer? 
Mr. Miller: 
Mr. Colton: 




And you are submitting to 
That is correct and accept-
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Mr. Colton: And as I understand it the 
State of Utah does not intend to put on any 
evidence other than the file? 
Mr. MHler: None whatever. 
Mr. Colton: I would like ----------------------
record a motion that the suspension of Mr. 
McAnerney's driver's license be vacated on 
the grounds for the reason that the State of 
Utah has failed to put on sufficient evidence 
to constitute good cause to show that Mr. 
l\1cAnerney is an habitually negligent driver, 
and that pursuant to the provisions of the 
applicable statutes and further pursuant to 
the request for a hearing made by me in writ-
ing in a letter addressed to Mr. Miller on Sep-
ten1be:r 8, 1958, it was requested that the De-
partment produce vvitnesses to testify under 
oath as to the reason for the Order of Sus-
pension on the grounds stated so that Mr. Mc-
Anerney through his counsel could cross ex-
amine these witnesses and examine the rele-
vant books and papers which would be pro-
duced pursuant to this request. 
lVIr. Mil'ler: The Department has deem-
ed under Section 41-2-19 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953 subsection 4 that Mr. McAnerney 
is an habitually negligent driver and denies 
the motion as heretofore stated by Mr. Col-
ton. 
Mr. Colton: Again for the record Mr. 
Miller as a background for another motion I 
would like to make I am not sure what rele-
vance to this hearing the fact that Mr. Mc-
Anerney's license was suspended on October 
7, 1957, has and without any showing of re-
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striction I would motion to strike from the 
record any records of this. 
Mr. Miller: The procedure of the Dri-
vers' License Division as established is that 
when an individual has three moving viola-
tions in any consecutive 18 month period the 
first suspension is a three-month suspension. 
The second suspension is a six-month suspen-
sion. 'The situation in this proceeding at the 
present time is that Mr. McAnerney has had 
his six months' suspension in accordance with 
the administrative procedure of the Depart-
ment. 
Mr. Colton: But doesn't it have any-
thing to do with whether Mr. McAnerney is 
or is not an habitual negligent driver? 
Mr. Miller : As in the fact that he has 
had a previous suspended license and has been 
before the Department and apprised of his 
violations and then the continued violations 
as shown by the record is evidence that he 
is an habitual negligent driver as provided 
in the section heretofore stated. 
Mr. Colton: I would like to move to 
strike any reference to the previous suspen-
sion on the grounds that the record as it now 
stands shows no reference to the previous 
suspension on the grounds of ------------------------· 
Mr. Miller: That will 'be denied. 
Mr. Co~ton: I take it the State rests. 
Mr. Miller: Yes, call Mr. McAnerney 
to be sworn in . . . 
Mr. Colton : I take it that the basis 
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upon which the State is acting are the viola-
tions which are shown on the file where it 
says "Applicant's Driving Record this side 
for Department use only?" 
Mr. Miller: And also the reports of 
conviction in the folder itself. 
Mr. Cotton: I notice that there is a 
line drawn betewen the first and second no-
tations. 
'Mr"'. Miller: That was a line made by 
myself when Mr. McAnerney was in my Of-
fice as of October 11, 1957, at which time I 
granted him a restricted license in connec-
tion with his record up to October '7, 1957. 
At that time McAnerney did testify describ-
ing in detail the facts and circumstances surround-
ing each event referred to in 'the Department's files. 
M'i'ller then entered an order suspending McAner-
ney's license from which McAnerney appealed to 
the District Court. McAnerney petitioned for re-
view, alleging that defendants had unconstitution-
ally deprived him of property without due process 
and improperly found him 'to be an habitual negli-
gent driver. (R. p. 36-39) 
The matter was heard again by the Honorable 
Aldon J. Anderson. The court stated a:t the outset 
of the hearing "As it stands, as the court views the 
statute, is the fact that the Department found he 
was a negligent driver, and you may put on evi-
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dence to refute that." (R. p. 10). Mr. McAnerney 
was put on the stand and testified to the facts 
surrounding the citations contained in the State's 
file. 
!The State put on no testimony other than that 
of Mr. Miller who merely stated that he had given 
Mr. McAnerney a hearing. Although the transcript 
does not show it, evidently the following documents 
were marked and accepted into evidence: 
Three reports of conviction for viola-
tion of motor vehicle laws, Form DLD-19 
3-56. 
Exhibit 3 had attached to it a form "Ci-
tation" of Utah Highway Patrol. Exhibit 1 
had upon it the words "Bail posted and for-
feited". 
The trial court then entered findings of fact 
reciting that '''Based upon the record of six arrests 
for moving vehicle violations contained in files of 
defendants herein, within a period of 18 months, 
three within the Sta:te of Utah, and three without 
the State of Utah, and based on the testimony of 
plaintiff 'before this court, plaintiff is declared to 
be an habituaJlly negligent driver," and the admin-
istrative action was affirmed. From this determina-
tion, Mr. McAnerney appeals. 
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APPELLANT IS NOT AN HABI'TUAL NEGLIGENT 
DRIVER. 
a. Definitions. 
b. The means by which the State attempted to 
'JYrov,e its case were improper and unconsti-
tutional. 
c. Even if the means used by the State to prove 
its case ~vere proper, the evidence is not 
sufficient to prove habitual negligence. 
POINT III. 
THE STATE ERRED IN USING 'THE SAME EVI-
DENCE TWICE. 
POINT IV. 
COURTS HAVE NOT HESITATED TO RIGIDLY 




Appellant, as one who drives on the publ'ic high-
ways much more than the average person, would be 
the first to recognize that the safety of all people, 
including himself, must be safeguarded by the 
State of Utah's sincere and earnest attempts to en-
force its traffic laws. But as history shows, it is 
often the overzealousness of those working for ad-
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mittedly worthy ends that pose some of the greatest 
threats to our democratic society. It is appellant's 
contention tha:t the cries of the public and of the 
press for traffic "enforcement" must not over-
shadow the basic rights and dignity of each citizen, 
and of the orderly process of law in a field which 
proba!bly brings more people in contact with the 
machinery of law enforcement than any other. Ap-
pellant contends that the State has not shown him 
to be habitually negligent. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT IS NOT AN HABI'TUAL NEGLIGENT 
DRIVER. 
a. Definitions. 
"Habitual" has been defined as something 
which is ''repeated by force of habit." Webster's 
New International Dictionary 2nd Sd. "Habit" is 
defined as "A settled disposition or tendency . . . 
leading one to do easily, naturally, and with grow-
ing skill or certainty what one does often." 'The 
State would have one believe that the record here 
pellant ·contends that the State has used an improper 
pocedure and has not shown him to be ha:bitual1y 
negligent. 
b. The means by which the State attempted to 
prove its cas.e were improper and unconsti-
tutional. 
The statute under which the respondents pro-
10 
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ceeded is Section 41-2-19, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. This provides inter alia that three moving 
violations of the motor vehicle laws of Utah shal1 
be deemed prima facie evidence of habitual negli-
gence and that the Department may immediately 
suspend the license without receiving a record of 
conviction whenever the Department has reason to 
believe that such person is an habitual negligent 
driver. 
However, the law further provides that upon 
suspending such a license the person shall be en-
titled to a hearing and further 
''Upon such hearing the Department or 
its duly authorized agent rnay administer 
oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attend-
ance of witnesses and the production of rele-
vant books and papers and may require re-
examination of the licensee. One or more mem-
bers of the Department may conduct such 
hearing, and any decision made after a hear-
ing before any number of the members of the 
Department shall be as valid as if made after 
a hearing before the full membership of the 
Department. After such hearing the Depart-
ment shall either rescind its order of suspen-
sion or, good caus.e appearing therefor, may 
extend the suspension of such license or re 
voke such license." (Emphasis ours.) 
Appellant contends that this statute places the 
burden of proof upon the State to show good cause 
if they choose to suspend the license, and that the 
administrative travesty set forth as a "hearing" 
11 
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in this case could not conceivably be construed as 
meeting this test. Moreover, Appellant contends that 
the trial judge also misconstrued the function of 
the statute by stating that it was up to the driver 
to refute this finding, and to base the court's con-
clusion to any extent on the evidence of convictions 
contained in the State's files was erroneous. 
Mr. Miller acted as judge and prosecutor. He 
merely looked at his file, found what he considered 
evidence of three violations, and made his deter-
mination. He expressly rejected appellant's rights 
to cross-examine those who executed the documents 
in question or to confront them and made his deter-
mination even prior to Mr. McAnerney's chance to 
tell his own story. 
It has been clearly established by many courts 
that such procedure is improper. 
"Where a hearing is required, it must 
be held in accordance with the statute or or-
dinance, and, where the officer before whom 
the hearing 'is had exercises quasi-judicial 
functions, he must exercise them in a legal 
manner. Such hearing is a judicial hearing 
a:t which the acting board or official may act 
only on . the specific charges made and 'the 
licensee has a right to be confronted by the 
witnesses who testify against him, and should 
be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine 
his accusers. The decision revoking the li-
cense must be based on legal evidence of suf-
ficient weight to support such charges; but 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if such hearing is civil in its nature, even 
though the charges made are based on the 
commission of a crime, the charges so made 
may be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence." 60 C.J.S. 492, Motor Vehicles 
Sec. 160. 
Thus a New York court in a hearing dealing 
with the revocation of a driver's license, where evi-
dence supporting the State was introduced in the 
form of affidavits from police officers, made the 
foUowing statement: 
"In determining that question it must 
be remembered that the license which has 
been annulled is of substantial value 'to the 
petitioner. It is a permit issued according to 
law by the Motor Vehicle Bureau for him to 
drive an automdbile, without which it would 
be unlawful for him to do so. He has a vested 
right therein which cannot be taken from him 
capriciously or arbitrarily. 
"In a proceeding of this kind the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles is given quasi-
judicial functions which he must exercise 'in 
a legal manner. 'The revocation of petitioner's 
license was not based upon a conviction ; there-
fore it can only be revoked after a hearing 
and upon good cause based upon comp~tent 
'legal testimony. Petitioner has a right to be 
confronted with the witness at such hearing 
and given an opportunity to cross-examine 
his accusers. That is the only way he can se-
cure a fair hearing (citing cases). Failure 
to give the accused an opportunity to be heard 
in his own defense and to cross-examine his 
13 
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accusers violates a basic right secured to every 
citizen by our Constitution. 
"In my opinion, substantial rights of the 
petitioner were violated to his prejudice when 
the Commissioner received the affidavit of the 
witness Barry and the testimony of the wit-
ness Garman without giving the petitioner 
an opportunity to be confronted by his ac-
cusers and to cross-examine them or either 
of them. 
"Petitioner's application to vacate the 
order of revocation of petitioner's license is 
granted." Re application of Goodwin, 173 
Misc. 169, 17 N.Y. Supp. 2d 426, 428 (1940). 
Accord, Re application of Kafka, 27'2 App. Div. 
364,71 N.Y. Supp. 2d179 (1947). 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in hold-
ing that proof was insufficient to justify revocation 
of a driver's license, stated: 
"As the hearing is a judicial hearing, it 
follows tha:t the decision of the Board must 
be based on legal evidence as sufficient weight 
to support the specific charges made. By the 
terms of the act the Board may in its dis-
cretion refuse to grant a license to any app1i-
cant whom for any reason it considers an im-
proper person. A broad discretion is thus 
given to the board which of course must be 
exercised in a manner reasonable and not 
arbitrary. But the power to revoke a license 
after a hearing is more restricted. The words 
of the act 'for any caetse the board may deem 
sufficient' must be construed in the light of 
14 
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the other parts of the act. The provision for 
notice and hearing restricts the power of the 
board to act only on the charges made. The 
Board revoked the 'license on the ground 'that 
Glass was an unfit and improper person to 
be licensed. The only support for this finding 
is that the board found him guilty of a single 
offense of receiving stolen goods. In our opi-
nion, the evidence is not sufficient to support 
this finding ... Although in the circum-
stances it is perhaps too much to expect that 
the established rules of legal procedure should 
he followed with the exactness required of a 
court of law, yet it is only fair to the accused 
that 'there should be a su!bstantial compliance 
with the fundamental rules of legal proceed-
ings ... " p. 245. Glass v. State Board of Pub-
lic Roads, R.I., 115 A'tl. 244, (1921). 
In Willis v. Commonwealth, Va., 56 S. E. 2d 222, 
( 1949), Willis was given a notice to appear and show 
cause why his license should not be suspended or re-
voked because he had been convicted of reckless driv-
ing on March 14, 1947, and that he had been involved 
in .accidents in Virginia on July 25, 1946, August 14, 
proceeding to suspend or revoke driving privileges 
because of involvement in accidents, the burden of 
proof was upon the Commonwealth. It sta:ted that 
while the properly authenticated abstract of a con-
viction of the defendant for reckless driving may 
constitute prima facie evidence that he operated 
his motor vehicle recklessly on the occasion involved 
and casts upon the defendant the burden of proof 
15 
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that his conduct was not such as to show that he 
was an unsafe driver or that his continued opera-
tion of a motor vehicle constitutes a hazard to 
other highway users. 
"If the explanation given in his testi-
mony is reasonable and credible, especially 
when not contradicted by testimony of any 
other witness, it should not be disregarded 
but should be weighed along with the other 
evidence in the case . . . the test is whether 
the revocation or suspension of the operator's 
license' is necessary for the safety of [others] 
on the highway'. :This must be determined on 
the 'basis of the past conduct of the defen-
dant." ( p. 224) 
The court held that the introduction at the 
hearing of reports of drivers of other cars and of 
investigating officers was prejudicial error. 
"We hold that it was prejudicial error 
for 'the court to consider the ex parte state-
ments contained in the reports. A fair trial, 
to be in conformity with the statutory pro-
visions referred to above, required that the 
appellant be given an opportunity to cross-
examine the persons who made these state-
ments. The reports themselves were c'learly 
inadmissible under the mandate of 'the sta-
tute. 
"The purpose of the statute is to deny 
the use of the highways to persons who are 
known to have been so reckless in their cus-
tomary operation of motor vehicles that a 
repetition of the same, or similar conduct, 
16 
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may be expected, and if it occurs, it will con-
stitute a menace to the safety of others. The 
statute has not only a laudable object, but a 
necessary one. Accidents due to carelessness 
or recklessness are taking a terrible toll of life 
and limb. But it was intended to apply only 
'to drivers who are, in fact, unsafe, and this 
fact the statute contemplates must be proved 
by clear and reliable evidence at a fair trial." 
See also Stella v. MacDuff, 281 App. Div. 800, 
119 N. Y. Supp. 2d 483 (1953). 
The trial judge neither treated this as a review 
of an administrative hearing or as a de novo proceed-
ing. He assumed that in the hearing before him 'the 
burden was upon McAnerney to overcome 'the ad-
ministrative finding. In order to do this, the judge 
should have at least looked to the administrative 
record to see if these v;e:re even colorable compliance 
with the statute and administrative due process. 
This would be the minimum standard for proper 
judicial revie·w. This was not done, and even if it 
had been done, the administrative record clearly 
showed tha:t there was not one scintilla of proper 
evidence to support 'the administrative finding. If, 
on the other hand, Section 41-2-20 Utah Code An-
notated 1953 is construed as requiring a hearing de 
novo, then this was obviousily not done here, as the 
State did nothing more to sustain its position than 
to introduce in evidence' (the transcript does not even 
show this was done) three unidentified blue pieces 
17 
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of paper. Under either alternative, the trial court's 
procedure was improper. 
c. Even if the means used by the State to prove 
its case were proper, the evidence is not 
sufficient to prove habitual negligence. 
To establish even a prima facie case under the 
statute, the State must have evidence of "three 
viola;tions" of the Motor Vehicle Code. Mr. Miller · 
relied solely upon the "Report of Conviction for 
Violation of Motor Vehicle Law." These pieces of 
paper remained unidentified, out of court declara-
tions by unidentified parties. Other than those pieces 
of paper there is no evidence of a conviction at all. 
There is no evidence that a complaint was ever filed 
in any of these matters, nor is there one bit of testi-
mony that McAnerney was convicted of any of these 
offenses. 
Even the "ticket" or "citation" issued by a traf-
fic officer (such as the one appended to Exhibit 3) 
is merely a notice 'to appear. (Sec. 41-6-167 UCA 
'53). As traffic offenses are a crime (Sec. 41-6-164 
DCA '53), the Code of Criminal Procedure applies, 
and this require the commencement of the action 
by complaint under oath (Sec. 77-57-2; 77-10-1 UCA 
'5'3) . Even the statutory provision that forfeiture 
of 'bai'l is equivalent to a conviction (Sec. 41-2-17c 
DCA '53) certainly means bai'l posted after a com-
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This problem is one that this court is of course 
quite familiar with because of the rule enacted by 
it on January 7, 1958, to be effective February 1, 
1959, providing a procedure whereby notices given 
by police officers may 'be treated as complaints. 
Moreover, each Utah offense charged against 
McAnerney \Vas a speeding charge for exceeding 
posted limits. Under Utah law, speeds in excess of 
posted limi ~s a ~e only prima facie evidence tha:t such 
speeds were not reasonable and prudent, and the sole 
statutory prohibition is that a driver may not drive 
at a speed greater than is "reasonable and prudent 
under the conditions and having regard to the actual 
and potential hazards then existing." Section 41-6-
46, Utah Code Annotated 1953. A review of the 
transcript of McAnerney's testimony in these cases, 
which is the only evidence before the court, sure1y 
does not justify a finding that his speed was not 
reasonable and prudent under the conditions. 
However, even if it would appear from his 
testimony that in one or two instances he was not 
exercising a reasonable and prudent standard, this 
is far from saying that this is evidence that he is 
prone to habitually so act. To prove habitual con-
duct, there must be some evidence that the person 
acts this way more frequently than he does not. 
For a man who drives up to 1,000 miles a week to 
be negligent once or twice in eighteen months is no 
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evidence at all as to what he does as a matter of 
habit. Concededly, if a man when driving only four 
times in eighteen months was arrested and con-
victed of speeding in three such instances, the evi-
dence of habit might be more persuasive, but this 
mere'ly shows that such a three-time test or standard 
is too vague and unreliable and has little correla-
tion to the actual facts in each case. 
POINT III. 
'THE S'TATE ERRED IN USING THE SAME EVI-
DENCE TWICE. 
McAnerney' s original suspension (reduced to 
a restriction) was based upon alleged offenses on 
March 8, 1956, March 28, 1957 and May 28, 1957. 
The Department made its determination as to these 
facts and exacted its penalty. McAnerney then went 
for almost a year without any violations at all in 
the State of Utah until a speeding charge on May 
19, 1958. Yet the Department then sought to resur-
rect the two latter of the previous charges and be-
cause the last three came vvithin an eighteen month 
period, McAnerney's 1icense was suspended again, 
this time for a six-month period. 
Under this procedure, the repentent driver has 
little chance of redemption. Each offense thereafter 
brings with it a penalty of ever increasing severity. 
There is absolutely no language in the statute to 
indicate that these offenses should bring a cumula-
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tive penalty. Such procedure certainly smacks of 
double jeopardy in the civil field. Reference there-
fore to the offenses used to impose a previous sanc-
tion is improper. 
POINT IV. 
COURTS HAVE NOT HESI'TATED TO RIGIDLY 
CONSTRUE STATUT'ES OF THIS SORT. 
Often the courts have proved the last recourse 
of the citizen from administrative bullying. Whether 
one classifies the driver's license as a property right 
or merely as a privilege, it is clear that in the middle 
of the 20th Century the right to drive an auto-
mobile is of extreme value, particularly where the 
man's livelihood depends upon this, as in the case 
of Mr. McAnerney here. 
'The courts have heretofore not hesitated in 
setting up exacting tests in those cases where this 
righ't is sought to be taken from one of its citizens. 
Thus our neighbor state of Wyoming quite re-
cently held a statute dealing with revocation of 
drivers' licenses unconstitutional. Eastwood v. Wyo-
ming Highway Department, 301 P. 2d 818 ( 19'56). 
That court quoted with approval a Virginia case 
where the court stated: 
"'The majority of the cases lay down the 
rule that statutes or ordinances vesting dis-
cretion in administrative officers and bureaus 
must lay down rules and tests to guide and 
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control them in the exercise of the discretion 
gran ted in order to be valid . . . " Citing 
Thompson v. Smith (Va.) 154 S. E. 579, 71 
A.L.R. 604. 
·The Supreme Court of Idaho has also held that 
a driver's license is a property right and that the 
procedure for revocation thereof followed in that 
case was unconstitutional. State v. Kouni (Ida. 
1938) 76 P. 2d 917. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, appellant contends that the 
administrative procedure used by the State is im-
proper and unconstitutional, and that the State has 
failed to prove even 'by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that appellant is an habitually negligent 
driver. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MABEY 
BILLINGS & STODDARD 
Albert J. Co1ton 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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